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WHAT’S INTENT GOT TO DO WITH IT? INTERPRETING
“PEACEFUL PURPOSE” IN ARTICLE IV.1 OF THE NPT
David S. Jonas*
Ariel E. Braunstein**
“I can’t explain what I mean. And even if I could, I’m not sure I’d feel like it.”1

INTRODUCTION
The drafters of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) seem to have taken the words of J.D. Salinger’s character, Holden
Caulfield, to heart: Since it entered into force in 1970, the NPT has been the
subject of contentious debate due, in large part, to its plethora of ambiguous
provisions.2 It would not be a stretch to assert that, if the drafters were asked
today to define any of these vague provisions, they might utter a retort similar
to Caulfield’s own response.
Perhaps the NPT’s most controversial provision, in terms of meaningful
current application (if only one must be singled out), is Part 1 of Article IV,
which deals with states’ rights to nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes.”3
Article IV.1 states: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the
inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”4 A frequent debate surrounding

*
Partner, Fluet Huber + Hoang; Former General Counsel, National Nuclear Security Administration;
Former General Counsel, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Law Center, The George Washington University Law School, and former Adjunct Professor at the U.S. Naval
War College. B.A., Denison University; J.D., Wake Forest University School of Law; LL.M., The Judge
Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; M.A., U.S. Naval War
College. Mr. Jonas previously served in the U.S. Marine Corps, concluding his service with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as the nuclear nonproliferation planner. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of Fluet Huber + Hoang, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the
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Government.
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1
J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 158 (Back Bay Books 2001) (1945).
2
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
3
Id. art. IV.1.
4
Id.
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Article IV is about the meaning and interpretation of “inalienable right.”5
Generally, Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS)6 adopt the position that the
NPT gives them the inalienable right to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes, and by limiting certain technologies and materials to which they may
have access, Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and other potential suppliers in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are violating that right.7 Conversely, NWS
emphasize that NNWS’ right to nuclear materials and technologies is
conditioned8 on compliance with Articles I and II; this gives credence to their
argument that NNWS are not entitled to all materials and technologies, which
would enable them to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle.9 This debate has
evolved into what some NNWS have called “nuclear apartheid,” in which they
claim that NWS deny them access to nuclear materials and technologies in order
to maintain the status quo hierarchy.10
However, there is another pressing ambiguity embedded in the text of Article
IV.1. Despite the frequent debate over whether states are entitled to unbridled

5
See generally Christopher A. Ford, Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The NPT, Article IV, and
Nonproliferation, in REVIEWING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (Henry Sokolski ed., 2010). It is
worth noting that the concept of “inalienable rights” dates back centuries and is perhaps best known in the
Declaration of Independence regarding “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” Id. at 312–13.
6
As per Article IX of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a Nuclear Weapon
State (NWS) is defined as any state “which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.” NPT, supra note 2, art. IX. Therefore, by definition, there are only
five NWS recognized by the NPT: the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. All other
states are necessarily Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), but not necessarily NNWS party to the NPT.
7
See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of Indonesia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 14, 1994 from the Permanent
Rep. of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Provisional Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.1995/14 (Apr. 6, 1995) (“There continues to exist unjustified restrictions and constraints imposed
on developing NNWSs regarding full access to nuclear technology for peacefully [sic] purposes. Unilaterally
enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, must not be used to prevent peaceful
development, especially in the nuclear area, and should be removed.”).
8
According to Article IV, states’ “inalienable right” to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be “in
conformity with Articles I and II” of the NPT. NPT, supra note 2, art. IV.1. Therefore, this right ultimately may
not be “inalienable” because it is conditioned on other requirements.
9
See, e.g., Christopher Ford, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Verification & Compliance,
Statement to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: NPT
Article IV: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (May 18, 2005) (“Some have asserted that any State Party in
demonstrable compliance with the NPT has a specific right to develop the full nuclear cycle, and that efforts to
restrict access to the relevant technologies is inconsistent with the NPT. The Treaty is silent on the issue of
whether compliant states have the right to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, but . . . it does provide for discretion
on the part of supplier states regarding the nature of their cooperation with other states.”).
10
For an excellent overview of this phenomenon, see generally SHANE J. MADDOCK, NUCLEAR
APARTHEID: THE QUEST FOR AMERICAN ATOMIC SUPREMACY FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT (2010).
There are no foreseeable financial benefits for NWS to gain by denying NNWS access to the full nuclear fuel
cycle; such denial is in the interest of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
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access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, nowhere does the NPT define
exactly what constitutes a “peaceful purpose.” This is a vital distinction,
especially considering that NNWS’ access to nuclear materials and technologies
is expressly conditioned on Articles I and II. Articles I and II only prohibit the
development and acquisition of “nuclear weapons” and “nuclear explosive
devices,”11 but there exists a host of nuclear materials and technologies that are
neither nuclear weapons/nuclear explosive devices nor strictly peaceful. Two
such examples are depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel—both of which are
used for military purposes.
While there are individualized, country-specific restrictions that delineate
what constitutes the use of nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes,” such as
export controls and nuclear cooperation agreements,12 there is neither a globallyaccepted definition for “peaceful purpose” nor international guidelines to
determine how to characterize materials that do not fall squarely within the
parameters of Articles I and II. Therefore, the question arises: How should states
in general—and the United States in particular—characterize materials that are
neither nuclear weapons/nuclear explosive devices nor meant strictly for
“peaceful purposes,” such as depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel?13 While
the U.S. position has long been that a “peaceful purpose” is “non-aggressive” as
opposed to “non-military,”14 an interpretation of “peaceful purpose” is
nonetheless necessary to verify whether this is an acceptable position.
This Article will first discuss the limited views that states have put forth
regarding the meaning of “peaceful purpose.” Next, it will incorporate the
standards set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)15 to
analyze and interpret “peaceful purpose.” It will then present the views
11

NPT, supra note 2, arts. I–II.
See Seth Hoedl, Ensuring Peaceful Use via International Licensing of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, in
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW—VOLUME III: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES 63, 77–79 (Jonathan L. Black-Branch & Dieter Fleck eds., 2016).
13
Some have argued that non-explosive devices that are not explicitly referenced in the NPT, such as
naval propulsion reactors, are necessarily non-peaceful as evidenced by “the wording in Article III [of the NPT]
and international practice . . . .” JOHN CARLSON ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE STATE OF PLAY 199 (Ramesh
Thakur & Gareth Evans eds., 2013). However, it is unwise to assume such a conclusion without further analysis
into both the text of the NPT and subsequent international practice.
14
While not defined explicitly in terms of the NPT, this U.S. interpretation can be inferred from its
interpretations of similar provisions in other treaties from the same time period to which it is a party. See, e.g.,
D. Goedhuis, Legal Implications of the Present and Projected Military Uses of Outer Space, in MAINTAINING
OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL USES: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM HELD IN THE HAGUE 253, 263 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana ed., 1984) (stating that the U.S. interpretation of “peaceful purpose” in the Outer Space Treaty is
“non-aggressive” rather than “non-military”).
15
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
12
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expressed both by the NWS and the NNWS as to the proper interpretation and
application of Article IV as a whole, with specific emphasis on “peaceful
purpose.” Finally, it will conclude by advocating that U.S. policy should dictate
that depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel should not be considered uses of
nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes.”
I.

AMBIGUITY AS A THEME: WHAT IS NOT A “PEACEFUL PURPOSE”

It is first important to note that “peaceful purpose” is not the only source of
vague language in the NPT. On the contrary, the NPT is rife with ambiguity that
has been the cause of fierce debate for nearly five decades.16 That being said,
Article IV is one of its most ambiguous Articles—as much for the terms it uses
as for those it does not. A prominent example is the notable absence of any
language referring to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR). The drafters of the
NPT were well aware of ENR while drafting the NPT, yet they consciously
chose to exclude that specific language—“enrichment and reprocessing”—from
Article IV.17 To specifically designate ENR as an inalienable right would be to
give all states legal authority to develop the entire nuclear fuel cycle, which
would, in turn, pose a great danger that states would divert the ENR technologies
from civilian uses to nuclear weapons programs.18 Because the NWS were very
hesitant to recognize such a right, both the NWS and NNWS eventually agreed
to the sufficiently vague language of Article IV as it reads today so that the states
in both groups would be able to present the final language as a victory to their
respective governments.19 This is indeed how the scenario played out: Article
16
See, e.g., David S. Jonas, Ambiguity Defines the NPT: What Does “Manufacture” Mean?, 36 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 263, 263 (2014).
17
See Eldon V.C. Greenberg, Peaceful Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in
REVIEWING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY 105, 112 (Henry D. Sokolski ed., 2010) (discussing the
rejected attempt by the Spanish delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference to “refer specifically
to the entire technology of reactors and fuels” because “it was not the intent of the framers of the NPT to create
an obligation to supply any and all forms of nuclear energy with a single exception of actual explosive devices.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Hoedl, supra note 12, at 80.
18
Once a state masters the nuclear fuel cycle, it is very easy to repurpose a civilian nuclear program to a
nuclear weapons program. The largest hurdle a state faces when launching a nuclear program is acquiring the
knowledge and technology to enrich uranium. However, once it has acquired these, a state can easily continue
to enrich uranium past the point required for civilian use to a level suitable for use in weapons. The same concept
applies to reprocessing: Once a state acquires the knowledge and technology necessary for reprocessing, it can
separate the plutonium created in the course of nuclear reactions from the spent nuclear fuel and keep the
plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
19
See Donald W. Greig, The Interpretation of Treaties and Article IV.2 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, 6 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 77, 82 (1974–75) (“Given the fact that the NPT deals with an area in which the
vital interests of contracting States are of paramount importance, it would hardly be surprising to discover that
the Treaty as a whole, as well as many of its provisions, gloss over potential areas of conflict in forms of wording
which create the impression that agreement has been achieved and translated into legal prescriptions. Thus, in
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IV.1, which underlines “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,”20
is ambiguous enough for NNWS to argue that ENR is implied as an inalienable
right and for NWS to argue that it is not—thus, an arguably win-win scenario
for both groups.
It is therefore clear that the issue of ambiguity is in no way unique to the
meaning of “peaceful purpose,” especially considering the way treaties were
drafted at the time the NPT entered into force.21 It is important to note at the
outset that “peaceful use” and “peaceful purpose” are used interchangeably
throughout the NPT.22 However, the difference between “use” and “purpose” is
of paramount importance and will be further analyzed.
While very little information is available about what constitutes the use of
nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes,” some officials have made statements
regarding what uses do not qualify as such.23 It is therefore helpful to review
these guidelines to determine which activities should be initially excluded from
the category of “peaceful purpose” under Article IV.1 in order to define what
does constitute a “peaceful purpose.”
U.S. officials have disclosed “warning signs” considered to be indicative of
non-peaceful nuclear activities and have listed criteria to consider in making
such a determination.24 Among the criteria are “the presence of unmarked

approaching the problem of interpreting the Treaty’s provisions, it is necessary to bear in mind that ‘the intention
of the parties’ might well include a deliberate choice in favour of accepting a text that gives an illusion, rather
than a reality, of agreement.”).
20
NPT, supra note 2, art. IV.1.
21
See Hoedl, supra note 12, at 67 n.14 (contrasting the NPT and the Biological Weapons Convention,
both concluded within two years of each other and opting not to define “peaceful purpose,” with the Chemical
Weapons Convention, concluded in 1993 and specifically “sidestepping the peaceful use ambiguity” by
identifying what is prohibited); cf. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature January 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (useful for comparison considering it entered
into force in 1967). Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty requires the moon and surrounding planets to be
exclusively used for “peaceful purposes” and goes on to prohibit “[t]he establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres” on
them. Id. It thus effectively declares that any activity other than those expressly listed may be considered
“peaceful purposes” and states that military personnel conducting research may also be considered a “peaceful
purpose.” Id.
22
As in the NPT, the authors cited in this article likewise utilize “use” and “purpose” interchangeably
(unless otherwise noted).
23

See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.

24

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION

AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 64 (2005).
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nuclear facilities” and any measures taken by a state which are seemingly
inconsistent with civilian nuclear programs.25
These factors are useful in determining what constitutes a “peaceful
purpose” because, in specifying activities beyond the realm of civilian use, they
help delineate what clearly is not a “peaceful purpose.” Scholars of nuclear
nonproliferation law and policy have likewise spoken out in support of these
criteria. One such supporter is Professor Eldon V.C. Greenberg, who serves as a
legal advisor to the Nuclear Control Institute. He has stated:
If the [proliferation] risks are great, if there can be no reasonable
civilian justification for particular forms of assistance or activities, and
if there can be no certainty that safeguards would be effective with
respect to such assistance or activities, then a presumption should arise
under the [NPT] that such assistance or activities are not for a
permissible, peaceful purpose but are rather for a weapons or explosive
purpose and therefore in violation of Articles I and II.26

Further, Robert Zarate concludes that Article IV presents a limited range of
interpretations for “peaceful purposes” because “peaceful nuclear energy ‘in
conformity with articles I and II’ excludes not only nuclear explosive technology
for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes, but also other nuclear technology and
assistance that could ‘assist, encourage or induce’ non-nuclear-weapon states ‘to
manufacture or otherwise acquire’ nuclear explosive technology.”27
Interestingly, none of these guidelines mention nuclear materials and
technologies that are used for military purposes but not as nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices. Such examples include depleted uranium (used both
in armor-piercing projectiles and tank armor and shielding)28 and naval reactor
25
Id. (listing the warning signs as “(a) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (b) procurement
patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including
the use of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (c) security measures
beyond what would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (d) a pattern of Article III safeguards
violations suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception
and denial efforts aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
(e) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons
purposes (e.g., heavy water production in a country the civil nuclear facilities of which use only light water as a
moderator, or pursuit of enrichment facilities when other, cheaper energy-producing resources or an outside
source of enriched uranium are available, or the pursuit of a full fuel cycle for a civil reactor program too small
to provide economic justification for such an effort).”).
26
Robert Zarate, The Three Qualifications of Article IV’s “Inalienable Right”, in REVIEWING THE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY 219, 233 n.18 (Henry Sokolski ed., 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
27
Id. at 221 (internal citations omitted).
28
Background Information on Depleted Uranium, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N,
https://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/llw-pa/uw-streams/bg-info-du.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2017).
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fuel (used to power nuclear submarines29 and currently being studied as a means
to power research and rescue submarines).30 While being utilized in the military
context may not immediately qualify as “non-peaceful” or violent, the use of
such materials and technology in that manner normally serves a non-peaceful
end.31 For example, while depleted uranium utilized in tank armor and shielding
is intended for defensive and passive—rather than aggressive—purposes,
depleted uranium is also used to make armor-piercing projectiles, which are
intended for aggressive purposes. Likewise, naval reactor fuel powering a
research submarine may be a passive use, but it is more frequently used to power
nuclear submarines or warships—a generally aggressive purpose.32 For both
depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel, whether they are considered to be
peaceful depends on how the state possessing them intends to use them.
While the guidelines presented supra are indeed helpful, they fail to render
exact classifications for depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel under “peaceful
purposes.” It is thus necessary to examine the text of Article IV itself, as well as
its drafting and negotiating history, to understand how the drafters defined
“peaceful purpose” as it relates to such nuclear materials and technologies.
II. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE IV.1
There are generally two primary schools of thought33 regarding treaty
interpretation: one that advocates for plain meaning of the text only and the other
that advocates for the general purpose of the text, including the plain meaning.34
Those who advocate for plain meaning only rely on “the notion of univocalism,
29
“Nuclear submarines” in this context will refer to those submarines employed by the military for
aggressive purposes—namely, warships. Both attack submarines (SSNs) and boomers (SSBNs) are classes of
warships.
30
Nuclear-Powered Ships, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/non-power-nuclear-applications/transport/nuclear-powered-ships.aspx (last updated Dec. 2017).
31
This has been acknowledged by the NWS, who also are the permanent members of the Security
Council. See P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, P5 GLOSSARY OF KEY NUCLEAR TERMS
54 (2015) (“There may be non-peaceful uses of nuclear material which would not be proscribed under the NPT
and to which safeguards would not apply during the period of such use (e.g. nuclear propulsion of submarines
or other warships).”) (emphasis added).
32
This is a generally aggressive purpose because nuclear submarines have non-aggressive uses, such as
gathering intelligence.
33
While there are various schools of thought and vast literature on treaty interpretation, this Article will
not delve into all of them; rather, it will focus on interpretation as set forth by the VCLT.
34
Rex J. Zedalis, “Peaceful Purposes” and Other Relevant Provisions of the Revised Composite
Negotiating Text: A Comparative Analysis of the Existing and the Proposed Military Regime for the High Seas,
7 SYR. J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 19 n.73 (1979); see also Zhang Xinjun, Intentional Ambiguity and the Rule of
Interpretation in Auto-Interpretation: The Case of “Inalienable Right” in NPT Article IV, 52 JAPANESE Y.B.
INT’L L. 35 (2009) (discussing auto-interpretation as it relates to the VCLT).
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i.e., that every term has but one meaning, that the meaning is easily identifiable,
and that the meaning controls.”35 However, the more internationally-accepted
method of interpretation, codified in the VCLT, is the general purpose
approach.36 This approach “seeks to effectuate the true intentions of the drafters
by construing ambiguous provisions in the context of the total treaty.”37 This
Article will therefore proceed with an analysis of “peaceful purpose” utilizing
the general purpose approach.
A. VCLT Standards
VCLT Articles 31 and 32 are the relevant provisions to consider regarding
treaty interpretation. When considering an ambiguous provision or term, Article
31(1) of the VCLT states: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”38 Article 31(3) states
that, in addition to the context of the treaty, it is important to take into account
the subsequent practice of the parties to correctly interpret a certain provision.39
If the ordinary meaning and subsequent state practice in the context of the
treaty’s object and purpose do not suffice, Article 32 allows for examination of
the travaux préparatoires, or preparatory works, as well as the “circumstances
of [the treaty’s] conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation
according to Article 31(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or (b) leads
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”40
1. Article 31 – Plain Meaning
According to Article 31 of the VCLT, the first step in determining the correct
interpretation of “peaceful purpose” must be to examine its plain meaning in the
context of the NPT’s object and purpose.41 At the outset, “peaceful purpose” in
Article IV.1 of the NPT must be distinguished from “peaceful use” as used in

35

Zedalis, supra note 34, at 19 n.73.
Id.
37
Id.
38
VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31.
39
Id.
40
Id. art. 32.
41
For a comprehensive analysis of the object and purpose of treaties, see David S. Jonas & Thomas N.
Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565
(2010).
36
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Article IV.2. The real distinction between these phrases lies in the definitions of
“use” and “purpose.”42
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “peaceful” as “devoid of violence or
force;”43 “use” as “the act or practice of employing something;”44 and “purpose”
as “something set up as an object or end to be attained; intention.”45 Combining
the definitions, “peaceful use” would be defined as the act or practice of
employing something which is devoid of violence or force. Similarly, “peaceful
purpose” would be defined as an object or end to be attained or an intention
devoid of violence or force.46 Both definitions correlate with the object and
purpose of the NPT as a non-proliferation treaty:47 to reduce nuclear weapons
proliferation to ensure a more stable world, as referenced in the Preamble.48
Therefore, the use of nuclear technologies only for ends devoid of violence are
mandated by such a scheme.
Because the definition of “peaceful” applies equally to both terms, the most
relevant distinction lies between “purpose” and “use”—specifically the presence
of intent in “purpose.”49 This is pertinent for determining whether depleted
uranium and naval reactor fuel should be categorized as “peaceful purposes”
under Article IV.1 because of their applications in the military context.
Ultimately, it is the intent of the state that matters—whether the state will, in

42
The dictionary definitions are not being used as an ultimate source of meaning. This is especially true
because the key terms here are phrases and not single words. Rather, the definitions are simply meant as a starting
point to demonstrate common understanding.
43
Peaceful, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).
44
Use, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).
45
Purpose, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).
46
It is relevant to note the application of this interpretation to nuclear deterrence, as this is a common
practice among states. While deterrence is effectively a threat of great violence, it is different from the “peaceful
purpose” question addressed here because deterrence does not actually promulgate any tangible violence or
aggression. A “peaceful purpose” contemplates only tangible actions, not threats. Therefore, it remains a separate
issue.
47
See Greenberg, supra note 17 (“Hypothetically, any nuclear energy application denominated as
‘peaceful’ would escape the prohibitions of Articles I and II. . . . But clearly it makes no sense to interpret Article
IV in such a fashion, for to do so would be to undercut the fundamental purpose of the Treaty to halt
proliferation, primarily through the prohibitions of Articles I and II.”) (emphasis added).
48
See NPT, supra note 2, pmbl. (“The States concluding this Treaty . . . . Considering the devastation
that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert
the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation
of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. . . .”).
49
While the element of intent may not be explicitly present in some uses of the term “purpose” (e.g., if
used as a synonym for “application”), that is not the case here. Even if the drafters meant for “purpose” to convey
a meaning of functionality, such that one state could ask the question of another state, “What purpose does this
nuclear activity serve?” the element of intent remains; the answer of the second state would be, “We intend it to
. . . ”.
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fact, use the depleted uranium for tank armor and shielding, rather than for
armor-piercing projectiles; or whether it will use the naval reactor fuel to power
a research submarine, as opposed to a nuclear submarine meant for aggressive
purposes.50
While contrasting these definitions in the context of the NPT’s object and
purpose provides some insight into the proper interpretation of “peaceful
purpose”—specifically that it is the state’s intent that ultimately matters—it is
still not enough to definitively categorize depleted uranium or naval reactor fuel.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine states’ subsequent practice.
2. Article 31 – Subsequent Practice
Article 31(3) of the VCLT directs that the subsequent practice of states may
also be considered as a tool of interpretation. Such a method is commonplace in
the international arena, as confirmed by Sean D. Murphy, a member of the U.N.
International Law Commission.51 This section will examine the subsequent
practice of states, which is founded on—but by no means constrained by—the
criteria set forth by the first Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA),52 William Foster. This section will also present theoretical
subsequent practice, as outlined by academics and scholars, and will then turn
to the actual subsequent practice of states. The actual subsequent practice will
be examined from the distinct viewpoints of NWS and NNWS.
a. Subsequent Practice – Academics and Scholars
While the drafters of the NPT may not have attached much importance to
the difference between the definitions of “use” and “purpose,” as evidenced by
the fact that the terms are used interchangeably throughout the NPT, Article

50
Even if a state declares that it only seeks to possess depleted uranium or naval reactor fuel without
having yet decided how to use the materials, an inquiry into how the state intends to use the materials once
possessing them would still be necessary to determine whether the eventual use would be peaceful.
51
Sean D. Murphy, The Relevance of Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice for the
Interpretation of Treaties, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 82, 85 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013) (“In my own
experience as a government attorney, it was quite common when analyzing a commitment under a treaty to take
account of not just the ordinary meaning of the text but the manner in which governments had applied the treaty
since its inception. Indeed, I would regularly read a provision in an investment treaty or environmental agreement
or military protocol, and see multiple possible interpretations or shades of meaning, which could only be resolved
by going into the files to figure out how the provision had been applied over time.”).
52
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has since been abolished and its functions
absorbed into the State Department. Records of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (RG 383),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-383 (last updated Oct.
18, 2017).
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31(3) of the VCLT dictates that an equally important part of interpreting a
provision is states’ subsequent practice regarding the implementation of the
relevant provision. Although the NPT provides no explicit definition of
“peaceful purpose,” and because the dictionary definition alone does not suffice,
over the years, scholars and government officials alike have taken a somewhat
more qualified stance on the proper interpretation of “peaceful purpose.” Some,
including ACDA Director Foster, have even expressed the importance of a
state’s intent regarding the use of nuclear technologies.
When Foster testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
1968, he established the criteria for subsequent interpretations of, and practices
implementing, nuclear activities for “peaceful purposes.” Foster stated that
“facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of
a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance.”53 Foster thus
implied that the starting point for determining what constitutes a “peaceful
purpose” is anything that is neither a nuclear weapon nor a nuclear explosive
device, per the terms of the NPT.
In his analysis of the “Foster criteria” (as they have come to be known),
James Acton, Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program and Senior Associate
at the Carnegie Endowment, states, “Foster could hardly be clearer: [i]n his
view[,] article IV permits pretty much anything short of building a nuke so long
as (i) it is carried out under safeguards and (ii) it is done with peaceful intent . .
. .”54 Bertrand Goldschmidt, former Chair of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and one of the founders of
France’s nuclear program, supported this view, believing that “explosion is
forbidden, everything else is allowed. Nothing in the NPT prohibits Party States

53
Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 90th Cong. 39 (1968)
(statement of Hon. William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) (emphasis added).
Foster went on to elaborate:

It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would
not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the
stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful nuclear program would violate Article II
so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the
development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties
of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors
under safeguards. Id.

Of course, if a NNWS possesses a nuclear explosive device, it is a per se violation of the NPT; thus, a “peaceful
purpose” analysis is not necessary.
54
James Acton, What Does Article IV Mean?, ARMS CONTROL WONK (Aug. 22, 2008),
www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/602007/what-does-article-iv-mean/.
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from following the technical path of their choice.”55 This means any application
of nuclear materials or technologies, so long as they are not used for nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices,56 would be classified as a “peaceful
purpose.” Such a definition would include depleted uranium and naval reactor
fuel, used in either an aggressive or non-aggressive military context, so long as
they were not used for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. These
views have thus become the standard for states’ subsequent interpretation and
practice.
Perhaps the most overarching modern interpretation of “peaceful purpose”
correlates with the dictionary definitions of the terms—namely, that a “peaceful
purpose” encompasses any end to be attained or intention that is not forceful or
aggressive.57 A different, but still overarching, definition is that “only nonmilitary uses are consonant with the provision.”58 Zedalis compares these two
definitions in the context of the Law of the Sea. He writes:
[I]f only non-military uses are permitted, then the high seas may not
be employed for any activity of a military nature, including the
navigation of warships. On the other hand, if “peaceful purposes”
simply prescribes a non-aggressive standard, then the high seas may
legally be used for a whole host of activities of a military nature as
long as none of the activities are aggressive.59

These definitions are useful for comparison with Article IV’s “peaceful purpose”
provision. If only non-military uses are permitted as “peaceful purposes” under
the NPT, then any nuclear activity of a military nature is deemed prohibited,
even if non-aggressive. Under this definition, the use of depleted uranium in tank
armor and shielding and naval reactor fuel that powers research submarines
would not be permitted. While neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear explosive
devices, both of these resources are still used in the military context, albeit nonaggressively. Zedalis’s other definition—that nuclear activities constitute a
permissible use in the military context as long as they are “non-aggressive”—
simply reiterates the ambiguity at issue here, for the aforementioned uses of
depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel are neither explicitly aggressive in the
military context nor peaceful. Therefore, other modern interpretations must be
examined for clarification.

55

Xinjun, supra note 34, at 44.
It is relevant to note that on its face, the NPT still permits peaceful nuclear explosions. However, the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) will prohibit such explosions upon entry into force.
57
Zedalis, supra note 34, at 18.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 18–19.
56
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One interpretation that has contributed to the subsequent practice of states
encompassed within “peaceful purposes” is the use of nuclear energy to better
society as a whole. Daniel Rietiker includes health and well-being, food security,
sustainability, combating climate change, and the right to life within the category
of nuclear activities employed for “peaceful purposes.”60 While Rietiker does
not distinguish between “use” and “purpose,” the technologies employed to
accomplish the goals he mentions retain the element of intent.61 In other words,
just as utilizing naval reactor fuel in a research submarine requires definitive
action on the part of the state employing the submarine not to use it instead for
aggressive purposes, a state must definitively choose only to enrich uranium to
low levels suitable for civilian purposes, such as generating electricity, rather
than to high levels suitable for nuclear weapons or naval reactors.62
Another modern interpretation of “purpose”—albeit extreme—is that it
should be deemed altogether irrelevant. Seth Hoedl “proposes that Article IV of
the NPT be interpreted63 so that all nuclear activities are presumed non-peaceful,
i.e., undertaken in pursuit of nuclear explosives and in violation of the NPT,
unless such activities are licensed by an international agency.”64 Hoedl argues
that eliminating any consideration of intent “would resolve the ambiguity of
peaceful use [by] . . . creat[ing] a legal bright line between peaceful and nonpeaceful . . . .”65
While these proposed interpretations of “peaceful purpose” are theoretically
useful, it remains necessary to examine states’ actual subsequent practice to see
how they have implemented this provision.
60
See Daniel Rietiker, Between Prosperity and Destruction: A Modern Interpretation of the Right to
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy in Light of the Protection of Human Rights and Future Generations, in
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. III: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES 21, 37–42 (Jonathan L. Black-Branch & Dieter Fleck eds., 2016). Other
applications may be included here as well, such as nuclear medicine. However, the use of a nuclear power plant
to provide electricity to a military base which presumably conducts aggressive activities would not be included
as a “peaceful purpose.” See Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1961, 1960 PUB. PAPERS 37,
58 (Jan. 18, 1960) (reflecting President Eisenhower’s categorization of powering military bases using nucleargenerated electricity as a use other than a “peaceful use” of atomic energy).
61
Rietiker, supra note 60, at 37–42.
62
It should be noted that, while many states use high enriched uranium (HEU) in their naval reactors,
some do use low enriched uranium (LEU). See George Moore, Cervando Banuelos & Thomas Gray, Replacing
Highly Enriched Uranium in Naval Reactors, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.nti.org/
analysis/reports/replacing-highly-enriched-uranium-naval-reactors/.
63
While Hoedl’s reference to “interpretation” is understood in context, his suggestion might be so
significant as to require an amendment to the NPT rather than simply a different interpretation. Hoedl, supra
note 12, at 69.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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b. Subsequent Practice – NWS
Greenberg succinctly presents the view of NWS by quoting Adrian Fisher,
who led the original NPT negotiations on behalf of the United States: “[T]he
NPT ‘does not require us to do something foolish.’”66 This implies that NWS
have largely adopted the view that any nuclear materials or technologies that
could potentially be repurposed to create nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive
devices must remain under IAEA safeguards. This view is consistent with the
object and purpose of the NPT and likely encompasses depleted uranium and
naval reactor fuel: while their most frequent use is not for nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices, states most often use these materials in the military
context.67 However, many NWS have avoided explicitly defining what
constitutes the use of nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes,” likely for fear of
being accused of “nuclear discrimination.”68
Rather than making such an explicit statement, NWS have instead opted to
emphasize the interrelationship of Articles I, II, and III to substantiate the point
that nuclear energy, even for “peaceful purposes,” must necessarily take a back
seat to the NPT’s overall nonproliferation objective.69 While methods of treaty
interpretation generally give full implementation to all parts of a treaty without
reading in a hierarchy among the various articles, it is nonetheless acceptable for
a state to argue for greater weight to be attached to a particular aspect of the
treaty—often depending on the current political climate. As Christopher Ford
explained at the 2005 NPT Review Conference on behalf of the United States:
The NPT does not require any specific sharing of nuclear technology
between particular States Party, nor does it oblige technology-

66
Greenberg, supra note 17, at 121 (quoting Hearings on S.1439 before the S. Comm. on Government
Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1976)).
67
See generally Andrew Womack, The Latest Nuclear War: Does the Use of Depleted Uranium
Armaments and Armors Constitute a War Crime?, 41 VT. L. REV. 405 (2016).
68
Ford, Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The NPT, Article IV, and Nonproliferation, supra note
5, at 246 (“At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, for instance, a working paper offered by several Western
governments carefully refrained from spelling out what Article IV actually entails, instead stressing that
whatever rights it may enshrine are not ones that countries necessarily have to act upon. ‘States may choose
individually not to exercise all their rights,’ the paper carefully noted, ‘or to exercise those rights collectively.’
In a similar vein, the European Union (EU) tap-danced around the question by declaring that ‘[t]he right to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy remains undisputed,’ but without describing what it actually means to have such
a right. Instead, the EU’s working paper on the subject merely pleaded the policy merits of ‘multilateralizaton/
guarantees of access to the fruits of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.’”).
69
Id. But see DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 75 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2011) (“The NPT is substantively and structurally comprised of three primary principled pillars—
i.e. civilian use of nuclear energy, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and disarmament of nuclear weapons
. . . . These three principled pillars together comprise the object and purpose of the NPT.”).
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possessors to share any specific materials or technology with nonpossessors. Indeed, to conform both to the overall objective of the
NPT—strengthening security by halting nuclear proliferation—and to
any Article I and III obligations, supplier states must consider whether
certain types of assistance, or assistance to certain countries, are
consistent with the nonproliferation purposes and obligations of the
NPT, other international obligations, and their own national
requirements. . . . While compliant State[s] Party should be able to
avail themselves of the benefits that the peaceful use of nuclear energy
has brought to mankind, the Treaty establishes no right to receive any
particular nuclear technology from other States Party—and most
especially, no right to receive technologies that pose a significant
proliferation risk.70

Based on Ford’s statement, it may be inferred that the U.S. position—and likely
the position of other NWS—is that, regardless of intent, NNWS are not
explicitly granted the right to materials or technologies that could result in the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices under the NPT.71
Therefore, to conform to the object and purpose of the NPT, NNWS should not
be allowed to access or develop such technologies.72 This view is especially
applicable because certain states have operated under the guise of acquiring
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only to renege on that premise and
initiate nuclear weapons programs.73 Charles Ferguson, writing for the Council
on Foreign Relations, further supported this contention by warning that “‘greater
efforts are needed . . . to limit the spread of fuel-making technologies’ and
declar[ing] that ‘the NPT’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies’ should be
‘properly interpret[ed]’ to make clear that ‘[t]his right . . . comes with the
responsibility to maintain adequate safeguards’ and . . . does not . . . guarantee
‘nuclear fuel-making facilities as part of that right.’”74

70
See Ford, Statement to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons: NPT Article IV: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, supra note 9. The corollary is also true: even if a
state has a right to the full nuclear cycle, that does not imply that that state has a right to receive any particular
item or component from another, specific state. Id. The right of states to acquire nuclear materials and
technologies does not impose a reciprocal obligation on other states to supply such items. Id.
71
But see China, Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 1 (NPT Conf. 2005, Working Paper No. 6, 2005)
(“Non-proliferation efforts should not undermine the legitimate rights of countries, especially the developing
countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”).
72
See, e.g., Promoting Expanded and Responsible Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, BUREAU OF INT’L
SECURITY & NONPROLIFERATION (Apr. 16, 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/83210.htm.
73
See generally Henry Sokolski, After Iran: Back to the Basics on “Peaceful” Nuclear Energy, ARMS
CONTROL ASS’N (Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_04/Sokolski.
74
Ford, Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The NPT, Article IV, and Nonproliferation, supra note
5, at 24 (quoting CHARLES FERGUSON, NUCLEAR ENERGY: BALANCING BENEFITS AND RISKS 16-17 (Council on
Foreign Relations Press, Council Special Report No. 28, 2007)).
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In practical implementation of this interpretation, three of the five NWS—
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—have provided monetary
support to the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI).75 The PUI “supports IAEA
projects that apply nuclear technologies to areas that include human health, food
security, water resource management, and the development of nuclear power
infrastructure.”76 Since 2010, the United States has given more than $50 million
to the PUI, and at the 2015 Review Conference, it pledged to give another $50
million by 2020.77 The United States has indicated that its support should be
used to fund projects that bolster “[h]uman health, [f]ood security, [w]ater
resource management, [and] [d]evelopment of infrastructure for the safe and
secure use of civil nuclear power” in underdeveloped countries.78 Additionally,
while the United Kingdom and France have both contributed funding to the PUI,
it is unclear how much they contributed or whether they dedicated their funds to
certain projects, as the United States did.79
It is therefore somewhat apparent that NWS’ subsequent practice has
evolved to eliminate any materials or technologies that could be used for nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosives—dependent on the state’s intent—from the
category of “peaceful purpose.” However, this practice neither presents a clear
definition of “peaceful purpose” as it relates to materials and technologies like
depleted uranium and nuclear reactor fuel, nor has it been accepted by NNWS.
c. Subsequent Practice – NNWS
As expected, many NNWS have not happily accepted the NWS practice of
placing restrictions on sharing sensitive nuclear materials and technologies.
Many NNWS understand Article IV to imply that they are entitled to access to
such materials and technologies because they are given the “inalienable right . .
. to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
. . . .”80 NNWS rely on the premise that nothing in Article IV precludes them
from such technologies and, therefore, as long as the technologies are in
compliance with Articles I, II, and III, they are encompassed in the “research,
75

See Funding, IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/about/pui/funding (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
NPT Compliance, NNSA, https://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/nptcompliance
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018). For a full list of the activities that the PUI supports, see What is the Peaceful Uses
Initiative (PUI), IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/services/key-programmes/peaceful-uses-initiative (last visited
Feb. 11, 2018).
77
See NPT Compliance, supra note 76.
78
Jennie Gromoll, Presentation for the Global Partnership Working Group, Stockholm (Aug. 29, 2012),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/202626.pdf.
79
See Funding, supra note 75.
80
NPT, supra note 2, art. IV.1.
76
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production, and use . . . for peaceful purposes” language.81 Indeed, in the NPT,
what is not expressly “prohibited is [generally] permitted.”82 Cuba vehemently
advocated for this interpretation at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, stating
that “the unilateral restrictions put in place by some States parties to the Treaty—
in most cases for political reasons—that impede other States parties’ peaceful
uses of nuclear energy are a violation of the Treaty, and should cease.”83
Similarly, Iran advocated that “[m]easures taken by the States Parties to prevent
nuclear proliferation should facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of the
recognized rights of the developing States Parties to the Treaty for the peaceful
applications of nuclear energy. Imposition of undue restrictions . . . is a manifest
violation of Article IV obligations . . . .”84
Certain scholars also adopt and champion the viewpoint of NNWS. Daniel
C. Rislove advocates on behalf of NNWS having the right to access all nuclear
materials and technologies, even if such materials and technologies have the
potential to be used for aggressive military purposes.85 He writes, “[f]irst, the
use of nuclear technology for energy generation does not automatically imply
an intention, or even a capability, of assembling a nuclear arsenal. Second, there
may exist a sovereign right to use nuclear technology not only for peaceful
purposes but for defensive military purposes as well.”86 Professor Daniel Joyner
takes the position that this is the correct reading of Article IV, especially in light
of the three pillars—civilian use of nuclear energy, nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons, and nuclear weapon disarmament—which comprise the object and
purpose of the NPT.87 Joyner writes:
NWS officials during the target era justified their disproportionate
prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT over the
peaceful use and disarmament pillars of the NPT, inter alia by
reference to the legal interpretation that the non-proliferation pillar of
the NPT is the principal, primary, central, or core principled pillar of
the treaty, and that the other two pillars are of secondary or lesser legal
81

Id.
Cable No. 121338 from the U.S. Dep’t of State to the U.S. Embassy, Bonn, Non-Proliferation Treaty
(Jan. 18, 1967) (on file with the National Security Archive, The George Washington University). This is also a
vital principle of international law, dating back to the Lotus case. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (standing for the proposition that a state has the right to act as it wishes, provided it has not
consented to any constraint upon its actions).
83
Cuba, Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 1 (NPT Review Conf. 2005, Working Paper No. 25, 2005).
84
Islamic Republic of Iran, Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy 3 (NPT Review Conf. 2005, Working Paper
No. 50, 2005).
85
See Daniel C. Rislove, Global Warming v. Non-Proliferation: The Time Has Come for Nations to
Reassert Their Right to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1069, 1073 (2007).
86
Id.
87
See JOYNER, supra note 69.
82
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status and weight. This was in stark contrast to the statements of many
NNWS parties to the NPT, and particularly developing countries, who
tended to stress the need for balance and equal prioritization among
the three pillars.88

In his statement on behalf of the United States to the 2008 NPT Preparatory
Committee, Joyner goes on to criticize Christopher Ford, emphasizing that what
the NWS perceived to be the most important aspect of the NPT—namely,
nonproliferation—cannot be construed as being the most important aspect
according to all states party because “the travaux préparatoires of the NPT,
when taken in their entirety show that NNWS generally did not share this
perception, and had their own set of equally ‘core’ issues which they demanded
be included in the treaty.”89 Joyner thus concludes that Article IV prohibits
NNWS only from those nuclear materials and technologies expressly prohibited
by the NPT.90
While Joyner’s interpretation is easily postulated on paper, it is much more
difficult for NNWS to implement. Specifically, the group from which the
NNWS would acquire such sensitive materials and technologies—or, at least
which they would need to consult for approval—is the NSG, of which the NWS,
who staunchly oppose this view, are a part.91 Nonetheless, many NNWS have
also contributed funding to the PUI, expressing their overall support for the
peaceful applications of nuclear materials and technologies.92
Considering these varied and sometimes conflicting interpretations, how
then to conclude a working definition of “peaceful purpose”? Joyner provides
some guidance in his analysis of the proper interpretation of “manufacture,”
found in Articles I and II of the NPT.93 Joyner discusses a definition of
“manufacture” that implicates the intent of the state to produce or otherwise
acquire a nuclear weapon but ultimately disqualifies such a definition because
of the difficulty of proving “intent.”94 He emphasizes the importance of the act

88

Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
90
Id. at 83 (“Article IV(1) serves . . . to clarify that states retain all rights to engage in nuclear activities
which are not clearly delineated by the conventional prohibitive obligation in Article II and by those terms
forbidden to them.”).
91
See Participants, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/participants1
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018) (illustrating that the NWS are part of the NSG).
92
See Funding, supra note 75.
93
Daniel Joyner, Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Legal Mandate of the IAEA, JURIST (Nov. 9, 2011,
5:00 PM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2011/11/dan-joyner-iaea-report.php; see also Jonas, Ambiguity Defines
the NPT: What Does ‘Manufacture’ Mean?, supra note 16.
94
See Joyner, supra note 93.
89
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(actus reus), rather than solely the requisite mental state (mens rea), which U.S.
domestic law requires to prove criminal intent and analogizes this concept to
demonstrate the difficulty of proving a state’s intent to manufacture a nuclear
weapon or nuclear explosive device.95 The same logic reasonably applies to the
interpretation of “peaceful purpose.”96 Because it is so difficult to prospectively
determine the intent of a state, it would be equally difficult to determine how a
state intends to use depleted uranium or naval reactor fuel as it would be to
conclude, as Joyner notes, that a state intends to manufacture a nuclear weapon
or nuclear explosive device simply because it has the capability to do so.97
Therefore, perhaps the most logical interpretation of “peaceful purpose”
would be to adopt the approach advocated by Hoedl; namely, that “purpose”—
insofar as it implies intent—should be deemed irrelevant and international
licensing controls should be instituted.98 However, because this is a prospective
view aimed at taking future action rather than determining what the drafters
meant by “peaceful purpose,” it remains necessary to consult the travaux
préparatoires of the NPT to see whether they provide any further guidance.
3. Article 32 – Drafting and Negotiating History
Regrettably, there is little to be found in the drafting and negotiating history
of the NPT that illuminates a possible definition of “peaceful purpose.” Indeed,
what is evident is that many states party to the NPT pushed to include such a
definition. In his seminal work on the NPT, Egyptian Ambassador to the United
Kingdom Mohamed I. Shaker outlined the desire of many of the states party to
the NPT (mostly NNWS) to clarify what constitutes the use of nuclear energy
for “peaceful purposes”:
95
Id. (“While domestic legal systems routinely provide for the inference of intent as one criterion for the
establishment of tortious or criminal liability, they seldom if ever provide for a determination of intent
prospectively, i.e. in domestic law we seldom if ever allow a finder of fact to infer from evidence what the
accused party intends to do in the future. Rather, we wait until the actus reus, or objective act-based element of
a crime is committed before putting actus reus and mens rea together to determine liability. This is both an
evidentiary point as well as a substantive element point. Substantively, it would be nearly impossible to ever
show from evidence that falls short of satisfying the legal concept of ‘manufacture’ as interpreted above, that an
accused state nevertheless intends in the future to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. It will in almost all
conceivable cases be just as reasonable, if not more so, to infer an intent simply to develop the knowledge and
capacity necessary to manufacture a nuclear weapon, without actually constructing working components or a
finished device.”).
96
Some might argue that the task of interpreting a treaty is not identical to the task of interpreting a statute
or contract, and that “intent” implies something different when applied to human beings as opposed to states.
However, this Article asserts that human beings set state policy and thus are the driving force of states’ intent;
therefore, the Article does not distinguish between the two when referring to “intent.”
97
See Joyner, supra note 93.
98
Hoedl, supra note 12, at 69.
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No area of peaceful nuclear energy seems to be precluded by the NPT
including the development and use of peaceful nuclear explosions
which are, however, the strict domain of the nuclear-weapon States.
Nevertheless, there was an urge by many States to define explicitly the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For example, the representative of the
FRG in Committee Two of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States found that “the wording of the Treaty was not sufficiently
explicit to permit a definition of peaceful uses, as distinct from the
prohibited production of nuclear weapons, which did not lend itself to
different interpretations.”99

Despite the fact that the negotiating history of the NPT is replete with suggested
examples of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, ultimately no definition of
“peaceful purpose” was included in the text of the treaty.100 This is not surprising
considering so many key terms remain undefined—including one as vital as
“NNWS.”101
However, Ambassador Shaker manages to categorize nuclear materials and
technologies which may qualify as “peaceful” into five groups, the objective of
which is either the generation of energy or the use of ionizing radiation and
radioactive isotopes.102 The five categories he identifies are: (1) mining and
concentration of nuclear raw materials; (2) production of enriched uranium; (3)
fabrication of nuclear fuel elements; (4) design, construction, and operation of
nuclear reactors; and (5) fuel reprocessing.103 Therefore, because the drafters did
not include an explicit definition of “peaceful purpose” and because materials
and technologies such as depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel do not easily
fit into any of the above five groupings, they should not be included in the
“peaceful purpose” category.
The exclusion of these materials would fit well with the interpretation of
“peaceful purpose” used by states in the few preparatory works available for
consultation. States generally adopted three prevalent interpretations: (1) a
peaceful purpose is anything not intended for a nuclear weapons program, which
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MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION
1959-1979 VOL. I, at 279–80 (1980) (citing U.N. Doc. A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.4 (Sept. 10, 1968)).
100
See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1568, at 7–8 (May 15, 1968).
101
See David S. Jonas, Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the “Final Four” Join the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 417, 443 (2005) (expanding the problem presented by the absence of a definition of “NNWS” to
examine whether the states not party to the NPT—at the time of writing, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North
Korea—could join while retaining their nuclear weapons).
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See SHAKER, supra note 99, at 282.
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Id.
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is distinct from use in a military context; (2) a peaceful purpose is anything not
intended to be used in a military context, which may or may not include a nuclear
weapons program; or (3) a peaceful purpose is anything not intended for a
nuclear weapons program—itself considered for use in a military context.104
The United States is one of the few states that encompassed all three
interpretations in one document. In a memorandum entitled “Value and
Feasibility of a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” the United States proposed
that “[t]he nuclear weapons non-manufacturing obligation should preferably
include acceptance of IAEA safeguards against possible diversion of fissionable
material from peaceful nuclear facilities to military purposes.”105 Here, peaceful
purposes are contrasted with military purposes, which indicates that a peaceful
purpose is anything not intended to be used in a military context. The
memorandum goes on to declare that “[i]n the absence of safeguards, it would
be very difficult to tell whether large-scale nuclear facilities for peaceful
purposes . . . are being used for a nuclear weapons program.”106 Here, a peaceful
purpose is assumed to be the exact opposite of a nuclear weapons program,
which, in conjunction with the first reference, leads the reader to believe that the
United States interpreted “peaceful purpose” to be anything not intended for a
nuclear weapons program, where the weapons program itself is considered to be
for use in a military context. This is confirmed at the end of the memorandum,
where it asserts that “[a]cceptance of IAEA safeguards by key non-nuclear states
would probably be encouraged if the nuclear powers were to accept such
safeguards over all their non-military nuclear activities, and/or to halt production
of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.”107 In this final declaration,
military purposes are equated with nuclear weapons programs, but both of those
are excluded from the “peaceful purpose” category.
In contrast, the focus of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
appears to have been solely on “peaceful purpose” as the direct opposite of
“military purpose.” In a draft of the NPT submitted on September 24, 1965, to
the President of the U.N. General Assembly, the USSR proposed that a section
of Article I read: “The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer nuclear
weapons, or control over them or over their emplacement and use, to units of the
armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons,

104
U.S. Internal Paper, “Value and Feasibility of a Non-Proliferation Treaty” (Dec. 10, 1964) (on file with
the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library).
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even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.”108
The USSR proposed similar language for Article II,109 presumably operating
under the interpretation that any use of nuclear materials or technologies in the
military context would not be for peaceful purposes.
Likewise, the government of Australia feared whether, even with
international safeguards and controls, nuclear materials and technologies for
peaceful purposes could be effectively monitored to prohibit states from
misappropriating them to violent and aggressive military purposes.110 Mexico,
too, likely interpreted “peaceful purpose” to mean the direct opposite of use in a
military context, as it was the state to originally propose including the language
of Article IV in the NPT.111 This language was derived from Article 17 of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco, which reads: “Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall
prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to
use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic
development and social progress.”112 It is fair to assume that Mexico attached
the same interpretation to “peaceful purpose” in the NPT as in the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, which explicitly states that a “peaceful purpose” is one that is meant
to develop the economic and social aspects of society rather than the military.113
III. MOVING FORWARD
It is indeed surprising that a definition of “peaceful purpose” has not yet been
demanded by states party to the NPT. While this may be because it has become
internationally accepted that a “peaceful purpose” is one that is not a nuclear
weapon or a nuclear explosive device, as expressly prohibited by the NPT, this

108
Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, attached to Letter from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept.
24, 1965) (on file with the National Security Archive, The George Washington University). It is important to
note that this language was aimed primarily at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NNWS. Id.
109
Id.
110
Cable No. 4923 from U.S. Embassy, Canberra, to Dep’t of State, Non-Proliferation Treaty (Apr. 10,
1969) (on file with The National Security Archive, The George Washington University).
111
See Ford, Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The NPT, Article IV, and Nonproliferation, supra
note 5, at 327.
112
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, opened for
signature February 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326 (entered into force Apr. 25, 1969) [hereinafter Treaty of
Tlatelolco]. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened for signature and entered into force prior to the NPT; the Treaty
of Tlatelolco was opened for signature in 1967 and entered into force in 1969, whereas the NPT was opened for
signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
113
However, the authors acknowledge that it is often difficult to construe meaning from silence or the
absence of a provision. Some might therefore argue that the absence of the Tlatelolco provision in the NPT was
deliberate and intended to convey a different meaning.
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definition may very well be contested at some point in the future as certain
nuclear materials and technologies become more advanced or, alternatively, as
they become increasingly important to matters of national security. The question
may therefore arise as to whether the use of such materials and technologies,
such as depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel, is permitted or prohibited by
the NPT.
In such circumstances, the following analytical framework is useful. First, it
is necessary to establish that the NPT does not define what is allowed as a
“peaceful purpose” the way it explicitly states what is prohibited—namely,
nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. Second, “peaceful purpose”
must be defined as per the dictionary definitions of each of its terms. This
establishes that a “peaceful purpose” is an intention that is carried out in a nonaggressive manner. Third, examining the subsequent practice of states will
reveal that, while “peaceful purpose” has evolved to mean the exact opposite of
the expressly prohibited nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, some
states have contributed alternative interpretations by means of subsequent
practice. However, none of these alternative interpretations expressly rule out
the use of nuclear materials and technologies for military purposes so long as
they are not used for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. These
alternative interpretations tend to fall along the division between NWS and
NNWS, however, which will likely influence the weight that they carry—
dependent upon whether the state raising the question is a NWS or NNWS.
Finally, it is helpful to consult the travaux préparatoires of the NPT to determine
whether they may aid in a proper interpretation.
Considering the above analysis, U.S. officials’ instinctive reactions would
likely be to advocate that, because the majority of states that possess depleted
uranium114 and naval reactor fuel115 are NWS, the use of those materials should
be permitted only by NWS. A primary justification would be the nearimpossibility of proving the element of intent inherent in “purpose”: if NWS
were to trust NNWS to use depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel only for
non-aggressive and non-violent military purposes, there would be no substantive

114
Doug Weir, Depleted Uranium – The Facts, NEW INTERNATIONALIST MAG. (Nov. 1, 2007),
https://newint.org/features/2007/11/01/the-facts/ (portraying a graph that shows that the states with the largest
stockpiles of depleted uranium are the United States, Russia, France, Britain, Germany, and Japan—mostly
NWS).
115
Nuclear-Powered Ships, supra note 30 (listing the states that have nuclear naval fleets as Russia, India,
the United States, China, and France—all NWS in addition to India which, although a non-signatory to the NPT,
has nuclear weapons).
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recourse if NNWS were to break the trust and use those materials for aggressive
military purposes.
However, this argument will likely raise cries of “nuclear apartheid” from
NNWS, which would further inhibit the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
To avoid such a case, the United States should instead advocate for a two-part
solution: (1) the states that already possess depleted uranium and naval reactor
fuel may continue using them, considering most of these states are NWS; and
(2) the NSG should undertake a case-by-case assessment for any other state that
wishes to utilize depleted uranium or naval reactor fuel. It is important to
acknowledge that increased assessments will cause the NSG to incur increased
costs, but in light of the greater nonproliferation goal, these costs should not be
a deterrent. This solution will more easily advance the global nuclear
nonproliferation agenda and combat allegations of discrimination that would
surely surface if the United States advocated that only NWS should be able to
use depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel without giving other states the
opportunity to be considered, particularly because the majority of the NSG’s
members are NNWS.
This proposed policy is related to and substantiated by existing U.S. policies.
For example, Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act directs that any state
potentially entering into an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the
United States (a “123 Agreement”) must guarantee that no materials or
technology it receives “will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for
research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other
military purpose.”116 Likewise, the United States has interpreted activities
“inimical to the interest of the United States” found in Section 57(b)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Act117 to include nuclear activities for military purposes.118 More
explicitly, in its 123 Agreements, the United States includes a section that
delineates exactly what constitutes the use of energy for peaceful purposes;
noticeably prohibited are any applications of nuclear energy or technology for
military purposes, which likely include depleted uranium and naval reactor
fuel.119
116

42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(3) (1954) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2077(b)(2) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly engage or participate in
the development or production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States except . . . (2) upon
authorization by the Secretary of Energy after a determination that such activity will not be inimical to the
interest of the United States . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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See generally Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, 10 C.F.R. § 810 (2017).
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Therefore, based both on the above analysis and related policies, the United
States should not interpret uses of nuclear materials and technologies not
explicitly prohibited by the NPT but which also may be used for military
purposes, such as depleted uranium and naval reactor fuel, to be included under
the NPT’s “peaceful purpose” category. Rather, the most prudent solution would
be for the United States to advocate that the states already using depleted
uranium and naval reactor fuel may continue to do so, but that the use of those
materials by any other state must be conditioned on a positive assessment by the
NSG.

material, equipment, and components, in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture, and
industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device, or any military
purpose.”); Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, U.S.-Viet., art.
1(O), May 6, 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 14-1003 (utilizing similar language); Agreement for Cooperation Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia Concerning Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy, Austl.-U.S., art. 2(k), May 4, 2010, T.I.A.S. No. 10-1222 (utilizing similar language).

